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We use microeconomic data on households to estimate the parameters
of the demand for currency derived from a generalized Baumol-Tobin
model. Our data set contains information on average currency, de-
posits, and other interest-bearing assets; the number of trips to the
bank; the size of withdrawals; and ownership and use of ATM cards.
We model the demand for currency accounting for adoption of new
transaction technologies and the decision to hold interest-bearing
assets. The interest rate and expenditure flow elasticities of the de-
mand for currency are close to the theoretical values implied by stan-
dard inventory models. However, we find significant differences be-
tween individuals with an ATM card and those without. The estimates
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of the demand for currency allow us to calculate a measure of the
welfare cost of inflation analogous to Bailey’s triangle, but based on
a rigorous microeconometric framework. The welfare cost of inflation
varies considerably within the population but never turns out to be
very large (about 0.1 percent of consumption or less). Our results are
robust to various changes in the econometric specification. In addition
to the main results based on the average stock of currency, the model
receives further support from the analysis of the number of trips to
and average withdrawals from the bank and the ATM.
I. Introduction
The generalized move toward lower inflation in both the United States
and Europe has stimulated considerable interest in the welfare gains
from price stability. One component of the welfare costs of inflation is
that induced by the distortions related to the efficient management of
cash balances for transaction purposes when a (nominal) interest-bear-
ing asset is available. Evaluating this component of the welfare cost of
inflation requires estimates of the interest and transaction sensitivity of
money demand. The theoretical framework behind most money de-
mand functions is that of models of cash management in the tradition
of Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956), and Miller and Orr (1966). Recently,
Lucas (2000), Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000), and others have pro-
vided empirical estimates of the welfare cost of inflation linked to cash
management using versions of these models. Many empirical questions,
however, are still open, mainly because of two important issues. First,
the concept of cash balances or “money” in the theoretical models of
the Baumol-Tobin variety does not obviously correspond to any of the
monetary aggregates, such as M1, that are used in time-series studies,
especially over periods of time in which large components of the money
stock become interest-bearing. Second, aggregation problems are im-
portant. Aggregate time series are unlikely to be informative when the
costs of cash management vary across different consumers and firms.
In particular, heterogeneity in fixed costs can induce important non-
linearities, so that only micro data allow the aggregation of individual
money demands.
Nonlinearities are most likely to arise when there are fixed costs in
the adoption of interest-bearing financial instruments, as stressed by
Mulligan (1997) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000), or when finan-
cial innovation introduces new financial instruments and means of pay-
ment, which are themselves costly to adopt. If new instruments alter the
costs involved in cash management, they also affect the parameters of
the demand for money and bias the parameters estimated with time-
series data. It is therefore crucial to estimate the relevant relations using
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microeconomic data and evaluate the welfare cost of inflation aggre-
gating these relations. At the micro level, however, there is very little
evidence, partly because data sets containing information on cash hold-
ings are few and far between. And even when available, they lack in-
formation on interest rates on assets alternative to money, making it
difficult to estimate the interest rate elasticity of the demand for money.
The empirical literature on money demand has therefore lagged behind
that on consumption and investment, where empirical studies routinely
address aggregation issues and use household- or firm-level data exten-
sively. Only recently have some papers sought to estimate the elasticity
of money with respect to transaction variables using household or firm
data sets (Mulligan 1997; Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 2000); but none
has provided definitive estimates of the interest rate elasticity. In par-
ticular, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin estimate this parameter from the
extensive margin faced by individuals who decide whether to hold an
interest-bearing asset. They lack data on household-specific interest rates
and use the marginal tax rate faced by each household to proxy for the
rate of return. The problem with this source of variation is that it is
highly collinear with wealth.
In this paper we present evidence from a unique data set that contains
direct information, at the household level, on currency and cash man-
agement activities (such as the average amount of currency held and
the number and size of withdrawals), interest rates, various financial
assets, the adoption and use of new technology, as well as consumption
and income flows and demographic and occupational variables. In short,
the data set we use appears tailor-made for estimating a sophisticated
version of the Baumol-Tobin model of the demand for money.
Our empirical specification controls for corner solutions in the use
of interest-bearing assets and for the adoption of new transaction tech-
nologies, such as that offered by automated teller machine (ATM) cards,
on which we have detailed information. The richness of the data set
and the variability observed across households and over the sample
period allow us to identify the structural parameters of the demand for
money and present methodologically sound estimates of the demand
for currency and of the implied welfare cost of inflation.
The data are drawn from a household survey run by the Bank of Italy
every two years. We use the surveys collected between 1989 and 1995
and merge them with two additional data sets on interest rates on check-
ing and savings accounts and measures of financial innovation. Using
Italy as a case study is of particular interest for a variety of reasons. The
most important is that in Italy a large portion of (M1) money, including
all checking and savings accounts, is interest-bearing. This implies that
demand deposits, on which we have detailed information in terms of
both amounts held and interest rates paid, represent the natural interest-
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bearing asset to be considered alternative to currency in models of the
Baumol-Tobin variety. This institutional feature allows us to cut through
a number of definitional issues that plague other studies of money
demand using either time-series or cross-sectional data. Second, nominal
interest rates on deposits display a remarkable degree of regional var-
iation that can be exploited to estimate the relevant elasticity of currency.
In addition to the cross-sectional variability, during our period, inflation
(and nominal interest rates with it) declined significantly in Italy, from
about 6 to 4 percent. Third, the payments system underwent consid-
erable change and modernization, notably (and most significantly for
our purposes) the diffusion of ATM cards, whose ownership tripled
during the sample period. As we have information on both use of ATM
cards and number of ATM points in the province of residence, we can
model the ATM adoption and hence the effects of technological prog-
ress on the demand for money and on the welfare cost of inflation.
We obtain precise estimates of the parameters of the demand for
money. We find an interest rate elasticity of between 0.3 (for non-
ATM users) and 0.6 (for ATM users) and substantial economies of
scale in cash management (a consumption elasticity well below unity).
Our estimates are robust with respect to changes in the empirical spec-
ification and to the methodology used to correct for selectivity biases
and potential endogeneity of the adoption of new transaction instru-
ments. The welfare cost of inflation varies considerably within the pop-
ulation but is never very large (0.1 percent of consumption or less).
This contrasts with the estimates obtained by other researchers. We
argue that the main reason for this difference is that inflation carries
low welfare costs in economies in which a large portion of the money
stock is interest-bearing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
our data and discuss some descriptive evidence on the consistency of
measures of average cash holdings, withdrawal size, and number of trips
to the bank. In Section III, we lay down a simple theoretical framework
that allows us to derive an empirically tractable demand for money
nesting the most popular models of cash management, and we present
estimates of a demand for currency on the whole sample, ignoring
selectivity problems arising from the decision to adopt interest-bearing
assets and alternative transaction technologies. In Section IV, we extend
our empirical specification to deal with these issues and discuss the
relevant econometric problems. We present our basic results in Section
V, where we show separate estimates for the demand for currency for
ATM users and non-ATM users accounting for the decision to hold a
bank account. Section VI discusses the implications of our estimates for
the computation of the welfare cost of inflation. We place particular
emphasis on the connection between the demand for money and the
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welfare cost of inflation in the presence of innovations in the transaction
technology, and we contrast our estimates with those of previous liter-
ature. In Section VII, we exploit additional information available in the
data set and find that the estimated equations for the size of withdrawals,
the fraction of income received in currency, and the number of trips
to the bank are all consistent with inventory models of money demand.
Section VIII presents conclusions.
II. Descriptive Analysis
We start presenting the survey of Italian households we use to estimate
our model of cash management and confronting the data with some of
the basic predictions of the inventory model. In doing so, we also de-
scribe some of the institutional features of the Italian payment system.
Our data set contains very detailed information on many of the var-
iables that one needs to estimate the inventory model, such as average
currency holdings, number of trips to the bank, size of withdrawals, and
so on. Moreover, because in Italy checking and savings accounts are
interest-bearing assets, for the vast majority of the sample, bank deposits
effectively represent the relevant alternative to currency. Therefore, the
nominal interest rate on deposits provides a proper measure of the
opportunity cost of holding currency. This allows us to obtain a precise
definition of the appropriate monetary aggregate to consider in the
inventory model. Furthermore, as we document and discuss below, de-
posit interest rates exhibit both geographical and time variability. We
use this variation to identify the interest rate elasticity of the demand
for currency. Finally, over the sample period we observe a substantial
increase in the adoption of new transaction technologies, namely ATM
cards. The survey tracks ownership and use of these transaction cards,
allowing us to identify the effect of technological innovation on the
demand for money.
A. Data Sources
We construct a sample merging data from three sources. The first is the
1989–95 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a collection
of four large cross sections of Italian households (1989, 1991, 1993, and
1995). Each cross section is representative of the Italian population.
Respondents supply information on consumption, financial wealth, and
several variables describing cash management: average currency bal-
ances, ATM and credit card use, size of withdrawals (separately at ATMs
and bank counters), amount of bank or postal deposits, number of trips
to the bank (distinctly for withdrawals at ATMs or at bank counters),
minimum amount of currency balances before making a withdrawal,
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and fraction of income received in cash. The Appendix reports the
main features of the survey, variables’ definitions, and averages of the
variables used in estimation. To the best of our knowledge, the only
other survey with detailed information on currency holdings is the U.S.
1984 Survey of Currency and Transaction Account Usage (Avery et al.
1986), and even this survey does not measure many of the relevant
variables to estimate inventory models (for instance, it does not have
data on financial wealth, interest rates, and consumption).1
The second data set is the Bank of Italy Monetary Statistics Survey.
This survey provides average interest rates on checking and savings ac-
counts on a quarterly basis, aggregated by the 95 Italian administrative
provinces. We can thus impute an interest rate that varies by year and
province for each household in the sample. The third data set, also
collected by the Bank of Italy, provides on a yearly basis the number of
ATM points in each province. This will be one of our instruments to
model the decision to actually use an ATM card and proves to be par-
ticularly useful to identify the demand for currency.
B. Currency, Withdrawals, and Trips
Table 1 reports sample means of several variables related to cash man-
agement from 1989 to 1995. All monetary variables are deflated by the
consumer price index, expressed in 1995 lire and then converted to
euros. The main feature that emerges from table 1 is the high level
(over 500 euros in 1989) of average “currency usually held at home.”
This confirms that in Italy the demand for currency is high by inter-
national standards (Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala 1996). Between 1989
and 1995, currency declines in real terms by 7 percent per year. Over
the same period the fall in nondurable consumption can explain only
a small portion of the reduction in currency. In fact, the currency-
consumption ratio also declines, from almost 4 percent in 1989 to 2.8
percent in 1995. Other factors must therefore be at work to explain the
shrinking currency.
The fraction of households with an interest-bearing account is about
85 percent in each of the sample years. Included are checking accounts,
savings accounts, and postal deposits; they are simply denoted bank
accounts from now on. In Italy, as elsewhere, the introduction and dif-
1 The survey includes 2,500 households. Some features of the survey are similar to ours.
About 14 percent of households used only currency to make transactions. At the time of
the survey, 42 percent of families had ATM cards. On average, individuals who use ATMs
maintain average cash holdings that are significantly smaller, and they replenish them
more often. We find similar patterns in our survey. For various reasons, however, the U.S.
survey is not strictly comparable with ours (for instance, currency includes money orders,
the sample design is different, etc.).
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TABLE 1
Currency and Financial Innovation
Variable 1989 1991 1993 1995
Fraction with a bank account 86.83 85.77 84.87 84.60
Fraction using ATMs 14.93 29.31 34.42 39.97
Nondurable consumption 17,106 16,488 15,869 15,620
Deposits 9,714 6,714 6,660 6,822
Financial wealth 20,470 14,637 17,213 17,350
Currency 579 475 338 374
No bank account 570 497 306 371
With bank account 581 471 343 374
No ATM card 571 492 351 397
With ATM card 624 432 313 339
Currency/consumption (%) 3.88 3.52 2.52 2.78
No bank account 5.66 5.41 3.56 4.10
With bank account 3.63 3.22 2.34 2.54
No ATM card 4.04 4.02 2.94 3.37
With ATM card 2.98 2.30 1.74 1.89
Average withdrawal at a bank … 429 544 482
No ATM card … 425 551 478
With ATM card … 441 534 488
Average withdrawal at an ATM … 219 207 198
Minimum currency 125 124 120 90
No ATM card 121 120 123 94
With ATM card 150 133 116 85
Total number of trips (yearly basis) … 28 26 30
To the bank (no ATM card) … 18 13 13
To the bank (with ATM card) … 14 12 11
To the ATM … 34 36 39
Fraction of income received in currency 52.19 46.29 45.60 44.85
Number of observations 7,973 8,127 7,663 8,100
Note.—The table reports data on consumption, deposits, financial wealth, currency, withdrawals, trips, and fraction
of income received in currency in 1989–95. Bank accounts include checking accounts, savings accounts, and postal
accounts. All averages are computed using sample weights. Nondurable consumption, deposits, financial wealth, and
currency are deflated by the consumer price index, expressed in 1995 lire and then converted to euros. Data are drawn
from the 1989–95 SHIW. See the Appendix for variables’ definitions.
fusion of ATM cards have been one of the main innovations in trans-
action technology of the last decades. Table 1 shows a massive increase
in the fraction of respondents using ATM cards, from 15 percent in
1989 to 40 percent in 1995. As we shall see, the diffusion of ATM cards
is the main factor explaining the shrinking currency. The currency-
consumption ratio is considerably higher for households with no bank
account and, among those with a bank account, for those that do not
hold an ATM card. Over time, the pattern of this variable is similar
across the different groups.
In addition to the average currency, the survey contains information
on the amount of currency that triggers a withdrawal and, after 1991,
on average amounts withdrawn (both at a bank counter and, for those
that hold a card, at an ATM point) and number of trips to banks and
to ATMs. Positive minimum currency before withdrawals is inconsistent
with a literal interpretation of the Baumol-Tobin model. However, un-
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certainty in the flow of expenditures and high transaction costs at very
low levels of currency can justify a positive level for the “minimum
currency” variable. It is interesting to notice that the minimum currency
is slightly lower for households with an ATM card.
The average withdrawal at bank counters increases from 429 euros
in 1991 to 544 euros in 1993 and declines to 482 euros in 1995. With-
drawals at ATMs are substantially smaller, a reflection of a cheaper trans-
action technology and daily limits on withdrawals at ATMs. The total
number of trips to banks or ATMs ranges from 26 to 30 per year. How-
ever, the average hides rather different time patterns because trips to
banks fall (from 18 to 13), whereas trips to ATMs increase (from 34 to
39).
Table 1 also shows that, on average, almost 50 percent of income is
received in currency. This high fraction indicates how important cur-
rency still is in the Italian payment system. The average tells only part
of the story. The fraction is much higher for some population groups,
such as pension recipients (pensions are typically paid in currency at
the post office) or households headed by those who are self-employed
(for instance, shopkeepers’ income is typically received in currency).
There are also substantial geographical differences. The higher level of
income received in currency in the South reflects the higher fraction
of pension recipients and self-employed and the importance of the un-
derground economy.
The information reported in the survey allows us to perform a first,
important check about the mutual consistency of these variables. The
average withdrawal (403 euros) times the number of withdrawals (27)
should be equal to the flow of cash expenditures, which is approximately
0.62 percent of nondurable consumption. In 1993 and 1995, we observe
all these quantities. The reported flow of cash expenditures (on a yearly
basis) is, on average, 10,188 euros, to be compared with 403# 27p
euros. This is a first, important check on the reliability of the10,881
survey responses. In a second check, consider that, according to the
standard inventory model of cash management, the average stock of
currency should be roughly equal to the sum of currency before with-
drawals plus currency held for transaction purposes or, equivalently, half
the average withdrawal plus minimum currency:
consumption
mˆp minimum currency (1)
2# number of withdrawals
and
ˆmˆp 0.5# average withdrawalminimum currency. (2)
As we mention in the previous paragraph, we have already checked the
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TABLE 2
Interest Rates and Characteristics of the Banking System, 1989–95
1989 1991 1993 1995
After-tax interest rate on Treasury
bills 9.19 9.15 7.72 7.92






































Source..—Data are drawn from the Bank of Italy Monetary Statistics Survey.
Note.—The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
equality of and However, since we have independent informationˆˆmˆ m.
on minimum currency, we can compare these two estimates of average
currency with the self-reported level of such a variable. The 1993–95
medians of and are 310 and 232 euros, respectively. They can beˆˆmˆ m
compared with 286 euros, the median of reported currency in 1993–95.
From these experiments we conclude that the variables in our data set
are broadly consistent with each other and with standard inventory mod-
els of money demand.
C. Interest Rates and the Payment System
Table 2 reports summary statistics on after-tax nominal interest rates
and other bank characteristics.2 Although in Italy nominal interest rates
on checking and savings accounts are rather sticky, partially reflecting
imperfect competition in the banking sector, they do vary considerably
across years, provinces,3 and deposit size (being substantially larger for
larger deposits). The table shows that nominal interest rates declined
1.08 percentage points, from 4.6 percent in 1989 to 3.5 in 1995. In any
given year, the standard deviation of the interest rate is between 0.3 and
0.4, or about 10 percent of the mean. The average reduction in after-
tax nominal interest rates on deposits matches almost exactly the re-
duction in the after-tax nominal interest rates on short-term Treasury
bills (1.27 percent). This implies that the spread between the two interest
rates is roughly constant, suggesting that the wedge between the nominal
interest rate on Treasury bills and bank deposits is independent of in-
flation, which has itself declined by 1.1 percentage points between 1989
2 During the sample period, nominal interest rates on deposits are subject to a 30 percent
flat rate withholding tax, which is therefore netted out to obtain after-tax measures.
3 The Italian territory is divided into 95 provinces corresponding broadly to U.S.
counties.
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and 1995. As we shall see in Section VI, this property is critical for
computing the welfare cost of inflation.
The most likely reasons for the geographical variability are the re-
gional differences in the cost of intermediating funds and in the degree
of competition between banks in local markets.4 We take these char-
acteristics as given and do not try to model the behavior of the banking
system in this paper. In table 2 we report the mean and standard de-
viation of some measures of competition in local credit markets, namely
the share of deposits of the five largest institutions in each province
and the average interest rate differential between loans and deposits.
There are persistent geographical differences in the frequency of
ATM users. While in the North the use of ATMs was relatively widespread
even in the earlier part of the period, the financial sophistication of the
South lags considerably behind even in recent years. It is this time-series
and cross-sectional variability in the diffusion of technology that allows
us to estimate the adoption decision as well as the effect of financial
innovation on money demand. The decision to use an ATM is likely to
depend not only on demographic characteristics, transaction variables,
and the opportunity cost of using currency but also on the use made
by other people and, ultimately, on the availability of ATM points in
each location. Table 2 indicates that there has been a substantial increase
in ATMs between 1989 and 1995 (from 100 to 280 per million residents).
Finally, note that the SHIW contains information on the province of
residence of the respondents. So we can merge the information in table
2 with the microeconomic data and assign to each household a nominal
after-tax interest rate and other characteristics of the banking system
that vary by province and year.
III. The Transaction Demand for Money
We derive our empirical specification of the demand for currency from
the McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) extension of the Baumol-Tobin
model. Let us assume that people need time to make transactions and
that money is a way to save on transaction time. The consumer chooses
optimal money balances in order to trade off the time cost of trans-
actions against the cost of holding money instead of an interest-bearing
asset yielding a nominal return of R per period. The time cost of trans-
actions results from the shadow value of time and, possibly, from the
fixed cost of withdrawing currency. Thus the consumer chooses money
m to minimize the sum of the cost of transaction time tw (the product
4 The correlation coefficient between the interest rate on deposits and an index of bank
concentration (the share of deposits of the five largest banks in each province) is .35,
significant at the 1 percent level.
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of transaction time t and the time cost of transactions w) and forgone
interest Rm, subject to a transaction technology:
min tw Rm
bc
gsubject to tp Ac , (3)( )m
where A measures technology improvements and c is consumption.
Money demand is then
1/(1b)wAb
(bg)/(1b)mp c . (4)( )R
This equation encompasses several models. By setting andgp 0
one obtains the Baumol-Tobin square root formula. If andbp 1, gp 0
equation (4) reduces to the Miller and Orr solution.5 Ifbp 2, g(
the demand for money is not homogeneous of degree zero in con-0,
sumption and in the interest rate. Taking logs and assuming that the
term wA depends only on calendar time t, one can regress the log of
average currency on the log of nondurable consumption, the log of the
interest rate on deposits in the province of residence, and a quadratic
time trend:
2ln mp 1.000 0.172t 0.008t  0.709 ln R 0.368 ln c,
(0.177) (0.008) (0.001) (0.047) (0.008) (5)
where standard errors are reported in parentheses. The number of
observations in our pooled cross-sectional data is 31,861, and the esti-
mated parameters imply and Thus the estimatedˆ ˆbp 0.410 gp 0.109.
consumption and interest rate elasticities are not too far from the values
predicted by the Baumol-Tobin model, though the assumption that they
are equal to one-half is rejected. The quadratic trend indicates that, on
average, the demand for money falls over the sample period.6
The finding that the demand for currency responds to consumption,
interest rates, and economic incentives in general is important because
very little is known about the demand for currency at the microeconomic
level. Sprenkle (1993) presents descriptive evidence drawn from the
1984 and 1986 Federal Reserve Bulletin that mean monthly currency ex-
penditure increases with family income less than proportionately, sug-
gesting substantial economies of scale in cash management. However,
5 In the model that we consider, the flow of transactions is deterministic and constant
over time, whereas Miller and Orr assume stochastic and infrequent cash flows.
6 Replacing the time trend with year dummies changes the results only slightly. The
consumption elasticity is unchanged, and the interest rate elasticity is slightly reduced at
0.5 (with a standard error of 0.048). We prefer to model technical progress as a quadratic
trend rather than with time dummies, in order to exploit at least part of the time variability
in interest rates.
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Sprenkle also points out that household demand for currency is largely
independent of the value of time and usual measures of opportunity
costs. Rather, people choose a standardized amount of currency to ob-
tain, for instance, making a withdrawal of $50 or $100 regardless of the
interest rate (see Sprenkle 1993, p. 181). Our empirical results strongly
contradict this view.
The simple regression ignores several important problems. First, equa-
tion (5) is the relevant equation of the demand for currency only for
households that have interest-bearing deposits. In commenting on table
1, we pointed out that about 15 percent use only currency for making
transactions. Estimation of the demand for currency must tackle this
classic selection problem. Second, transaction costs and even the pa-
rameters of the transaction technology may differ for households with
access to ATM technology. Given the increased use of ATMs over time,
it is therefore important to control for this factor while recognizing that,
in all likelihood, card holding is an endogenous decision. Finally, the
time cost of transactions is likely to differ across individuals according
to education, employment, and demographic variables. In the next sec-
tion we present an econometric specification that deals explicitly with
each of these problems.
IV. Econometric Specification
The decisions to hold an interest-bearing asset and an ATM card are
discrete choices and therefore involve similar conceptual (and econo-
metric) issues. But there is one important difference. The adoption of
a new technology, such as an ATM card, can affect the parameters of
the demand for currency but does not change the qualitative nature of
that demand. For individuals who do not hold interest-bearing assets at
positive interest rates, however, there is no immediate opportunity cost
of holding currency. This is why we shall estimate the demand for cur-
rency only for households that hold the relevant alternative assets, cor-
recting for selection bias. At the same time, we allow the parameters of
our model to differ across regimes according to ATM card ownership,
while taking into account the possible endogeneity of ownership.
We generalize the McCallum-Goodfriend framework to take into ac-
count innovations in the transaction technology and the fact that many
consumers do not hold interest-bearing assets. Given transaction or
adoption costs or both, ownership of such assets and adoption of new
payment technologies are choice variables. The consumer chooses to
open an account if the benefits (less interest forgone) exceed its adop-
tion costs. Conditional on having a checking account, similar consid-
erations apply to the adoption of the ATM technology. As the conceptual
issues are similar, here we discuss only the adoption of a new technology
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and how money demand is modified by the use of ATM cards. Similar
considerations apply to the decision to hold a checking account.
When considering adoption costs, one should distinguish between
costs per period (such as annual fees) and one-shot costs (such as learn-
ing costs). While these two types of costs are both relevant and might
have different implications for dynamic general equilibrium models,
our analysis focuses on costs per period. In Section V, we present some
evidence on their importance and provide some bounds for them. We
also argue that costs per period are important.
Let H denote an indicator variable that equals one if the consumer
has an ATM card, zero if not. If adoption has a cost, a consumer will
switch to the ATM technology only if the benefit exceeds that cost. Let
the cost of adoption Z(x) depend on a vector x of consumer charac-
teristics and on other variables affecting the adoption decision, such as
the availability of the ATM technology and the monetary cost of using
the card. Adoption of the new transaction technology will thus take
place if
benefitp w(t  t ) R(m  m ) 1 Z(x), (6)Hp0 Hp1 Hp0 Hp1
where and denote, respectively, optimal money balances andm tHpi Hpi
transaction time conditional on ( 1). Since all variablesHp i ip 0,
affecting the demand for money also affect the benefit from adoption,
they will also affect the decision in (6). In particular, the benefit depends
on the value of time w and on the interest rate R. If the ATM technology
implies a proportional gain in time, it can be easily shown that an
increase in either w or R makes adoption more likely. Furthermore, an
increase in the volume of transactions c raises both money holdings and
the time spent transacting, thus increasing the benefit from adopting
a superior technology. Finally, the decision to adopt the new technology
depends on the vector of variables that affect the cost of adoption, x.
This second group of variables is crucial for identification, as discussed
further in Section V. Similar considerations apply to the decision to hold
a bank account, as discussed by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000).
In the empirical application, we estimate the demand for currency
controlling for the bias induced by the choice of having an interest-
bearing asset (a bank deposit) and by the choice of switching to the
ATM technology. We model the two discrete decisions as probit models.
In particular, we estimate a probit for having a bank account on all the
observations. We then estimate a probit for having an ATM card in the
sample of households with a bank account. Finally, we estimate the
money demand equation correcting with the appropriate Mills ratios.
The currency equation is estimated separately for the sample with bank
accounts and ATM cards and with bank accounts and no ATM card.
Denote by and the indexes that de-Dp d x  u Hp d x  uD D D H H H
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termine the decisions to open a bank account and to have an ATM
card, respectively. The correction terms in the currency equation are
then for households with a bank accountE[eFu 1 d x ∩ u 1 d x ]D D D H H H
and an ATM card and for those with aE[eFu 1 d x ∩ u ! d x ]D D D H H H
bank account but without an ATM card. Since we are interested in ATM
use conditional on holding a checking account, we can estimate the two
probits sequentially and not simultaneously. Formally, the model has
four regimes and is estimated as a switching model with two endogenous
shifts.
If one does not want to rely on the nonlinearity of the Mills ratio
alone to achieve identification, it is necessary that some variables af-
fecting the decision to have a bank account and the decision to have
an ATM card do not directly affect the demand for currency. While two
variables are sufficient for identification, we use several (their selection
is discussed in the next section). In addition to the identifying variables,
we introduce in the probit regressions all variables that affect the de-
mand for money. They include nondurable consumption, the log of the
nominal interest rate, calendar time, and proxies for heterogeneity in
the value of transaction time (education, occupation, and family
structure).
Once it is recognized that H (the decision to use an ATM card) and
D (the decision to use a bank account) are choice variables, it is clear
that the interest rate affects optimal money balances also through H
and D. Ignoring the endogeneity of alternative payment systems and of
the decision to use a bank account can bias the interest rate elasticity,
particularly in periods of intense financial innovation.
V. Results
Table 3 gives our main results. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates
of the probit models for the decision to have a bank account and the
decision to have an ATM card, conditional on having a bank account.
Columns 3 and 4 contain the coefficients of the demand for cash for
households with and without an ATM card.
As discussed above, all variables that enter the demand for currency
also determine the choice of using a particular transaction technology.
Furthermore, identification of the money demand equation requires
that some variables that affect the choices of having a bank account and
an ATM card do not affect the average stock of currency. Ideal candi-
dates are fixed costs associated with these discrete choices. Unfortu-
nately, a direct measure of these costs is problematic. We rely, instead,
on variables that are likely to be related to such costs. In particular, we
consider the number of ATM points in the area of residence at the end
of the past year. If there are network externalities, the cost of adoption
TABLE 3
Determinants of Bank Accounts, ATM Use, and the Demand for Currency










































































































































2R .596 .250 .177 .184
Sample size 31,863 26,922 9,334 17,588
Note.—In the probit regressions the dependent variable equals one if the household has a bank account (an ATM
card), zero otherwise. Bank accounts include checking accounts, savings accounts, and postal accounts. In the currency
equations the dependent variable is the logarithm of real currency. The regressions also include number of children,
number of adults, age, age squared, number of income recipients, a dummy for gender, and dummies for employed,
self-employed, and retired heads.
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declines with the fraction of the population that has already adopted
the technology and, especially, with the availability of ATM points in
the area of residence. We expect that network externalities increase the
probability of using an ATM card.
We also consider dummies for the area of residence (city center,
semicenter, or outskirts), which capture the notion that households
living in rural areas face different costs and benefits of opening and
operating a bank account or holding an ATM card. The connotation
of residence areas in Italy (and more generally in Europe) is different
from that in North America. Often what we define as “outskirts” is
equivalent in terms of social status to the American inner cities. Vice
versa, the “city center” is often the most exclusive residential area. Fi-
nally, according to our model, financial wealth should not affect the
demand for currency (once we condition on consumption); however,
financial wealth is likely to affect portfolio choice and the fixed cost
incurred when operating a new transaction technology.
Table 3 indicates that the nominal interest rate and consumption
coefficients are positive and significantly different from zero in both
probit equations. In particular, the size of the interest rate coefficient
in the ATM probit is about half that in the bank account probit. Con-
sumers with lower education are less likely to use a bank account and
an ATM card than consumers with a college degree (the reference
group). Finally, all variables that identify the model (number of ATM
points, area of residence, and financial wealth) are generally significantly
different from zero and have the expected signs. In particular, the num-
ber of ATM points in the province is a very strong predictor of both
probabilities.
There are two objections that can be raised against the use of the
number of ATM points as an identifying instrument: (a) that it can be
endogenous if the installation of ATM points is demand driven and (b)
that it also affects the demand for currency directly, perhaps because it
reduces precautionary currency holdings at least among cardholders.
To address the first problem, we replace the number of ATMs in the
probit regressions with two indicators of the structure of the banking
sector: the share of deposits held by the five largest banks in the province
and the share of deposits in the province held by cooperative banks.
Both correlate with the introduction of ATMs and are significant in the
probits.7 The results of the second-stage regressions are essentially
unaffected.
7 While market structure is affected by both demand and supply factors, we think that,
in the short run, supply factors affect it more directly. We find that banking concentration
discourages adoption of both bank accounts and ATM cards, consistent with the idea that
market power (as measured by market concentration) raises adoption fees for deposits
and ATM cards. The share of cooperative banks, on the other hand, favors the adoption
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The second objection is unlikely to be relevant for individuals not
using an ATM card. Furthermore, as the model is still formally identified,
we can add the number of ATM points to the second-stage regressions
of the demand for currency. When we estimate this regression, we obtain
an insignificant coefficient. Finally, the use of the industry structure
variables discussed above as an alternative to the number of ATM points
also addresses this potential problem.
Columns 3 and 4 of table 3 report the estimates of the endogenous
switching regressions for the demand for currency separately for house-
holds with a bank account and an ATM card and for households with
a bank account but no ATM card. The consumption and the interest
rate elasticities have the expected sign and are precisely estimated in
both equations. However, important differences between the two re-
gimes emerge. The consumption elasticity is larger for households with
no ATM card (0.44 and 0.35, respectively), whereas the interest rate
elasticity is twice as large (in absolute value) for households with an
ATM card (0.59 compared to 0.27). The implied structural coeffi-
cients of the transaction technology are and forˆ ˆbp 0.69 gp 0.10
the group with an ATM card and and for the groupˆ ˆbp 2.69 gp 1.07
without an ATM card, leading to the following transaction technologies:
0.35 0.44c c
t p A , t p A . (7)Hp1 Hp1 Hp0 Hp00.69 2.69m m
In the group with an ATM card, transaction time is close to being
homogeneous of degree zero with respect to consumption and money
balances ( is close to zero). This implies that money demand is closegˆ
to being homogeneous of degree zero with respect to consumption and
the interest rate, as in the Baumol-Tobin model. In the group without
ATM cards, the homogeneity property does not hold, but is close toˆb
the theoretical value of two of the Miller and Orr model. The difference
between the two groups implies that there are significant nonlinearities
in the aggregate demand for money.
Substituting the optimal value of currency in equation (7), one can
also derive an expression for the ratio of optimal transaction time for
ATM and non-ATM users as a function of c, R, technological change,
and all the other terms that appear in the money demand equation:
0.35t K 1Hp1 Hp1
p , (8)
0.44 0.32 0.09t K R cHp0 Hp0
where for 1 as estimated in the two equationsK p (wAb) ip 0,Hpi Hpi
of ATM cards. The reason is that cooperative banks in Italy are linked through their
association and can more easily internalize the network externalities from faster installation
of ATMs. Results are available on request.
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for currency for ATM users and nonusers.8 The ratio between the two
estimates of transaction time is a useful measure of the efficiency gain
entailed by the ATM technology. The expression can be calculated for
each individual in the sample. On average, the ATM technology reduces
transaction time by 42 percent. Given the assumed form of the trans-
action technology, note from equation (8) that the gain in transaction
time is proportional to the reduction in the demand for money following
the adoption of the ATM technology.
Equation (8) allows us to put some bounds on the estimated adoption
costs. Consider first those who have not adopted the ATM card, and
rewrite equation (6) as
t mHp1 Hp1
minimum benefitp wt 1  Rm 1 .Hp0 Hp0( ) ( )t mHp0 Hp0
Since these consumers have not adopted, their benefits represent a
lower bound on adoption costs. Using the estimated parameters for
those with and the gain in transaction time from equation (8),Hp 1
we can compute the expression above for each individual in the sample;
on average, it is equal to 11.3 euros (with a standard deviation of 7.8
euros). With the same line of reasoning, one could consider the adopters
and compute the loss that they would suffer had they not adopted. This
amounts to estimating an upper bound on adoption costs of 28.1 euros
(with a standard deviation of 14.3 euros). As expected, these costs are
not particularly high.
The estimated adoption costs are broadly consistent with direct evi-
dence we have on the adoption fees charged by Italian banks when one
considers that adoption costs must also include the value of time spent
learning the new technology. In Italy, only a few banks do not supply
ATM cards. Most of those that do charge a fixed annual fee and a fee
for each transaction. On a sample of 38 banks for which we obtained
information, the average yearly adoption fee is 6.2 euros (the standard
deviation is 3.1 euros). Four banks charge no fee, and among those
charging a fee, the average is 6.9 euros per year. Since consumers have
different incentives to search for a bank that provides an ATM card,
access to the ATM technology is effectively a choice variable.
The specifications in columns 3 and 4 of table 3 also include several
demographic variables: dummies for the education of the household
head, number of adults and children in the household, number of
income recipients, gender and age of head, dummies for employees
and for the self-employed, and a dummy for retired heads. These var-
iables proxy for differences in the value of time and, more generally,
8 We compute the term wAb as the exponential of the sum of all the terms in the
demand for money equation except for consumption and the interest rate.
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in transaction costs across different population groups. Most of them
are important determinants of money demand. As they reflect several
factors, the interpretation of these coefficients is not straightforward.
In some cases, like the education dummies, their relative magnitude is
consistent with an interpretation in terms of the value of time.9 The
Mills ratios in both equations are significantly different from zero, show-
ing that ignoring selection problems would bias the estimated
coefficients.
The results we obtain are robust to changes in the specifications re-
ported in table 3. For instance, we considered alternative definitions of
consumption, we excluded from our sample retired household heads,
and we replaced the time trend with year dummies. This specification
search does not affect the main results reported in table 3. In particular,
we consistently find that there are small differences in consumption
elasticities between the two regimes and that households with ATM cards
have a much higher elasticity to the interest rate than households with
no cards. The different elasticities are reflected in different transaction
technologies between the two groups shown in equation (8).
To take into account the possibility of regional fixed effects, we have
also included dummies for the region of residence (South and center
of the country) both in the probits and in the money demand equation.
These variables might proxy for the relevance of the underground econ-
omy and delinquency, which might raise the demand for currency. The
signs of the estimated coefficients are not entirely consistent with this
interpretation: the underground economy and criminal activities are
deemed to be more widespread in the South than in the rest of the
country, whereas our results indicate that currency is higher in the South
and in the center than in the North. In any event, the sign and mag-
nitude of the coefficients on consumption and interest rates are robust
to the inclusion of these variables. As a further check on the potential
impact of the underground economy, we exclude the self-employed,
and the results are once again basically unaffected.
VI. The Welfare Cost of Inflation
Bailey (1956) first showed that the welfare cost of inflation arising from
the inefficiencies of carrying out transactions with means of payment
that do not pay interest can be measured by the integral under the
demand for money. In this section we evaluate the implications of our
9 Unfortunately our data set does not contain a variable that measures with precision
the hourly wage and therefore the cost of time. Furthermore, for households with multiple
earners or out of the labor force, it would not be easy to proxy the cost of time even if
wage rates were available. For similar reasons, it is difficult to give a straightforward in-
terpretation of the coefficients of these demographic variables.
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estimates for such a welfare cost and compare our results to previous
evidence. We stress, however, that in these computations we ignore other
possible costs arising from inflation, such as the distortions built into
the tax system, the possibility that relative price changes are confused
with general price increases, and other nonneutralities arising from
inflation. Moreover, our results refer only to the household welfare cost
since we do not consider the demand for money by firms.
A. The Existing Evidence
Lucas (2000) has recently evaluated the welfare cost of inflation deriving
the money demand equation from two general equilibrium models (the
Sidrauski model and a general equilibrium version of the McCallum
and Goodfriend model). He calibrates various welfare cost functions
using estimates of the interest rate elasticity in low-frequency time-series
data. Assuming a constant elasticity money demand function of the form
where y is real gross domestic product and A a constant0.5mp AyR ,
term, Lucas estimates that in the United States the welfare cost of re-
ducing inflation from 14 percent to 3 percent is on the order of 0.8
percent of GDP. He shows that the specific functional form (logarithmic
or semilogarithmic) of the money demand equation does not affect this
calculation much (except at very low interest rates). Any correction of
the welfare cost that comes from different assumptions about the fiscal
transfer policy adopted to implement a given interest rate reduction
affects only trivially the welfare cost computations.10
The magnitude of the welfare cost of inflation depends not only on
the functional form of the demand for money or assumptions about
fiscal policy, but also on two other crucial factors. The first factor is the
definition of money and of interest-bearing assets. As welfare costs are
proportional to the money stock held by consumers and firms, different
definitions provide very different results. For instance, Lucas defines
monetary assets as M1, the sum of currency and demand deposits, an
aggregate that ranges from 15 to 30 percent of GDP in most industri-
alized countries (18 percent in the United States and 30 percent in Italy
in 1998). The crucial assumption here is that currency and deposits are
the only means of payments and that they pay no interest. However,
Feldstein (1997) points out that the demand deposit component of M1
is now interest-bearing and defines as monetary assets currency plus
bank reserves, an aggregate that is on the order of 6 percent in both
the United States and Italy. Using an interest rate elasticity of the mon-
10 Several studies provide estimates of the welfare cost of inflation in general equilibrium
models: see Cooley and Hansen (1989), Gomme (1993), Dotsey and Ireland (1996), and
Bullard and Russell (1997).
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etary base of 0.2, Feldstein places the welfare cost of inflation origi-
nating from the distortion of the demand for money at less than 0.1
percent.11
The second factor is the proportion of consumers who hold interest-
bearing assets in addition to monetary assets. In the presence of trans-
action and adoption costs, not everyone will choose to invest in both
assets, and aggregation issues become crucial in evaluating the interest
rate elasticity of money. In this context, significant progress has been
made by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000). They note that almost 60
percent of U.S. households interviewed in the 1983 Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) held no financial assets other than currency and check-
ing accounts. They interpret this fact as evidence of high transaction
costs in investing in interest-bearing assets. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
evaluate the elasticity of money demand at low interest rates by looking
at the elasticity of the decision to hold interest-bearing assets at small
quantities of assets.
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin’s estimates also suggest that the interest
rate elasticity is indeed small at low levels of the interest rate. The reason
is that when the interest rate falls, more and more households choose
not to incur the transaction cost, and fewer and fewer households use
resources to economize on cash holdings. In other words, when the
interest rate tends to zero, only households with interest-bearing assets
incur the time costs associated with holding monetary assets, but they
become fewer. Ignoring transaction costs and zero holdings of interest-
bearing assets can therefore overestimate the welfare cost of inflation
at low levels of inflation. The money concept Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
use is even broader than the one used by Lucas, since they define as
monetary assets the sum of checking and savings accounts (with the
exclusion of currency). In the remainder of this section we provide
calculations of the welfare cost of inflation using our estimates. We then
replicate Lucas’s and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin’s concepts of welfare
costs and compare them with our own set of estimates.
B. Our Evidence
As in Bailey (1956), the welfare cost of inflation corresponding to a
given nominal interest rate R, W(R), can be measured as the area under
11 Even though the welfare costs of inflation are bound to be low in monetary economies
in which a substantial portion of the money stock is interest-bearing, Feldstein stresses
that the welfare gain from reducing inflation is a permanent benefit. He evaluates the
welfare gain of moving from 2 percent inflation to price stability at about 1 percent of
GDP. He finds that most gains from price stability do not derive from an increase in money
demand (unlike Lucas, he uses a narrow concept of money), but from the reduction in
inflation-induced tax distortions in the intertemporal allocation of consumption and in
the demand for housing.
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the (inverse) money demand function in the interval Thism(R) m(0).
measure of the welfare cost implicitly assumes that the socially optimal
currency m(0) is that of an economy in which monetary policy induces
a steady deflation at the Friedman optimal rate, so that FromRp 0.
(4), the welfare cost is given by
R
1/(1b) 1 (gb)/(1b) b/(1b)W (R)p m(R) Rm(r)p (wAb) b c R . (9)m 
0
The first term, is the exponential of the constant term in1/(1b)(wAb) ,
a log-log estimate of money demand; and canb/(1 b) (g b)/(1 b)
be readily inferred from the interest rate and consumption elasticities.12
Equation (9) is the welfare cost of inflation for an individual with a
bank account and access to a given payment technology. However, when
computing the welfare cost, we must also take into account the effects
of interest rate changes on the asset ownership and on the selection of
the technology. Given our model, the overall welfare cost is a weighted
average of the welfare costs of households with and without ATM cards,
the weights given by the proportion having a card. In turn, the welfare
cost is multiplied by the proportion of households with a bank account:
¯ ¯ ¯welfare costp F (R){F (R)W(R)D H Dp1,Hp1
¯ ¯ [1 F (R)]W(R) }, (10)H Dp1,Hp0
where is the probability of having a bank account evaluated at the¯F (R)D
interest rate and the probability of having an ATM card eval-¯ ¯R F (R)H
uated at Equation (10) highlights that the interest rate has threeR¯.
effects on the welfare cost of inflation. The direct effect is the change
in money demand following the change in the interest rate; this direct
effect is different in the two regimes. The two other effects are indirect,
because changing the interest rate changes the fraction of people with
a bank account and the fraction with an ATM card through the F (7)D
and functions. We know from Section V that these indirect effectsF (7)H
are important since both choices are affected by the nominal interest
rate.
Equation (10) also highlights that to compute the welfare cost of
inflation we do not need to look at the behavior of those without bank
accounts ( ). The reason is the same as in Mulligan and Sala-i-Dp 0
Martin, but applied to the choice between currency and bank accounts
(our interest-bearing assets), not between bank accounts and other
interest-bearing assets. Other things equal, people who have chosen not
12 Note that this equation truly measures welfare costs only if one assumes that the
government can finance its expenditures by nondistorting taxes (Fischer 1981; Lucas
2000).
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TABLE 4
Welfare Cost of Inflation for Households with and without an ATM Card (5
Percent Interest Rate)
Year













1989 1,212 29.29 .13 5,729 8.69 .05 7,973 11.06 .07
1991 2,321 21.12 .10 4,612 7.05 .04 8,127 10.07 .06
1993 2,608 16.95 .08 3,801 6.27 .04 7,663 9.56 .06
1995 3,193 14.79 .07 3,446 5.87 .04 8,100 9.03 .06
Total 9,334 18.88 .09 17,588 7.18 .05 31,863 9.93 .06
Note.—Welfare costs are computed on the basis of the estimated coefficients of table 3 and are expressed in euros.
denotes the welfare cost as a percentage of nondurable consumption.W/C
to use a bank account at the going interest rate will not choose to open
one at lower interest rates. For them, the welfare cost is zero.
By comparison with previous studies, there are three main advantages
of our data set and approach. We can estimate the interest rate elasticity
of money demand exploiting geographic and time variation in interest
rates. We can address the selection problem discussed by Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin, and we can estimate the effect of the interest rate on
adoption decisions. Finally, we allow for different transaction technol-
ogies whose adoption can be endogenous.
The welfare costs for the two regimes and for the population as a
whole are reported in table 4. The computation uses the estimated
coefficients in table 3 and assumes that initially the interest rate is 5
percent for each household ( ) and that the socially optimalR¯p 0.05
inflation rate requires Overall we find that the welfare gain ofR¯p 0.
a five-point reduction in inflation is only about 10 euros, or 0.06 percent
of nondurable consumption (0.10 percent for a 10-point reduction in
inflation).
For households with an ATM card the welfare cost is considerably
larger than for the other group. There are two reasons for this differ-
ence. First, the interest rate elasticity for this group is larger in absolute
value than for the group with no ATM (0.59 compared to 0.27; see
table 3). Second, the ATM group includes a larger number of people
with higher education and, more generally, a higher value of time,
corresponding to higher transaction costs.
The welfare cost generally declines over time, particularly in the sam-
ple with ATM cards, reflecting the negative time trend affecting the
money demand equation. Note that the aggregate welfare cost is fairly
constant because the declining impact of the time trend is offset by an
increase in the fraction using ATMs. This highlights the importance of
aggregation issues during periods of financial innovation. The same
issue of aggregation also emerges in table 5, where we tabulate the
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TABLE 5





Welfare Cost W/C Welfare Cost W/C
Less than elementary school 4.89 .05 9.46 .10
Elementary school 7.64 .06 13.39 .10
Junior high school 10.54 .06 17.18 .10
High school 13.02 .07 20.10 .10
College 14.28 .06 21.59 .08
Total sample 9.93 .06 16.25 .10
Note.—Welfare costs are computed on the basis of the estimated coefficients of table 3 and are expressed in euros.
denotes the welfare cost as a percentage of nondurable consumption.W/C
welfare cost by education for two levels of the interest rate (5 and 10
percent). The welfare cost increases with education, reflecting the
higher shadow value of time for individuals with higher education.
The experiment computes the welfare cost assuming a nominal in-
terest rate of 5 percent for each household, about the level prevailing
at the beginning of the sample period. But in fact we know that interest
rates vary across provinces and years in our sample. Thus we compute
the welfare gain from reducing the nominal interest rate by five per-
centage points for each household in the sample starting from a level
of 5 percent plus its sample value. The pattern of welfare costs is similar
to that in table 4.
In principle, the evaluation of the welfare cost of inflation should
also take into account the distortions involved in the management of
other monetary assets, not only currency. However, this would involve
taking a stance on the effect of a reduction in inflation on the interest
rate differential between other financial assets and bank deposits
( ). While it is reasonable to assume that a change in inflation isR  RB
reflected in an equal change in the after-tax nominal interest rate, the
interest rate differential depends on technology parameters as well as
on the market structure of the banking sector. Therefore, it is not clear
how it will be affected by a change in the rate of inflation.13 As in
Feldstein (1997), if is independent of inflation, to compute theR  RB
welfare cost of inflation it is sufficient to consider the effect of changes
in the nominal interest rate on the demand for currency. We provide
evidence that is relatively constant in the sample in Section IICR  RB
(see table 2).
13 Marimon, Nicolini, and Teles (1997) present a general equilibrium model with mul-
tiple means of payments and show that the equilibrium interest rate differential depends
on the cost of providing “electronic money” and on the market structure of the financial
sector.
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C. Comparing Our Results with Those of Lucas and Mulligan and Sala-i-
Martin
The difference between our approach and that in Lucas (2000) depends
on the selection issue and a different monetary aggregate. If we were
to ignore the selection issue and use the baseline specification (5) rather
than equation (10), the cost of inflation would be higher (39 euros, or
0.2 percent of annual consumption). The difference with respect to the
welfare cost displayed in table 3 is explained by the facts that households
without a bank account have a welfare cost of zero in equation (10)
and that the estimated interest rate elasticity derived from equation (5)
is higher in absolute value (0.7) than in each of the two groups in
equation (10). Suppose now that we also ignore that bank accounts are
interest-bearing, include them in the monetary aggregate as in Lucas’s
paper, and apply the same parameters in equation (5) to this larger
monetary aggregate. We would obtain a welfare cost of inflation of 3.2
percent of consumption. This is a consequence of the fact that deposits
are 42 percent of nondurable consumption, whereas currency is less
than 3 percent of consumption. Thus focus on a different monetary
aggregate is the main source of difference with Lucas.
There are also two differences between our approach and that of
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin. First of all, they focus on the extensive mar-
gin, that is, on the effect of the interest rate on the adoption decision
of interest-bearing assets, because they do not observe interest rate var-
iation in their sample. We can take into account explicitly and without
further assumptions both the intensive and the extensive margins. The
second difference is that Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin use different mon-
etary and interest-bearing aggregates (savings and checking accounts
on the one hand and stocks and bonds on the other). They do not
observe currency and ignore that bank accounts might pay interest.
To compare our estimates with those of Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin,
we estimate a money demand function in which the monetary aggregate
is defined as bank accounts (checking and savings accounts). The op-
portunity cost of money in this specification is the spread between the
nominal interest rate on Treasury bills and the nominal interest rate on
deposits ( ). The correct estimation strategy is to estimate a moneyR  RB
demand function correcting for two sources of selection. First, not all
households have a bank account (15 percent in our survey). This prob-
lem is ignored by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, who drop 25 percent of
the sample, that is, households without bank accounts (currency is not
observed in the SCF). The second source of selection is the fact that
only 58.7 percent of households have financial assets besides demand
deposits (41 percent in the SCF). This is the adjustment that Mulligan
and Sala-i-Martin make to their money demand equation.
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For comparison, we thus estimate a money demand equation on the
sample of those with a bank account and with financial assets other
than a bank account (denoted by the indicator variable dummy B, 58.7
percent of the sample), correcting for the two sources of selection bias.
We use the same specification as for bank accounts in table 3 for the
two first-stage probits and for the money demand equation. Results are
qualitatively similar to those of Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin. In particular,
the log of financial wealth is positive and highly significant in the probit
equations. The consumption elasticity in the money demand equation
is 0.058 (with a t-statistic of 2.52), which is similar to the effect that
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin and Bomberger (1993) obtain from trans-
action variables in the demand for deposits. The elasticity of money
demand with respect to is precisely estimated at 0.34 with a t-R  RB
statistic of 4.81.14 Following the same steps that lead to equation (10),
this model implies that the welfare cost of driving the spread Sp
to zero isR  RB
¯ ¯ ¯welfare costp F (S)[F (S)W(S) ], (11)D B Dp1,Bp1
where is the probability of having a bank account evaluated at the¯F (S)D
spread and the probability of having financial assets other than¯ ¯S F (S)B
bank accounts evaluated at Equation (11) highlights that the spreadS¯.
has three effects on the welfare cost of inflation: a direct effect, because
changing the spread changes the demand for deposits; and two indirect
effects through the and functions, because changing the spreadF (7) F (7)D B
changes the fraction of people who have a bank account and the fraction
of people who invest in interest-bearing assets. We know from Mulligan
and Sala-i-Martin that the decision to invest in interest-bearing assets is
important in their sample. They instead ignore the other margin (the
decision to open a bank account).
Evaluating the expression (11) for a spread of 5 percent (i.e., driving
to zero a 5 percent spread between the bond rate and the deposit rate)
results in a welfare cost of 0.8 percent in the sample of those with a
bank account and other financial assets, the term in the¯W(S)Dp1,Bp1
brackets in equation (11). Accounting for both sources of selection
reduces the welfare cost to 0.5 percent. The contribution of this re-
duction comes mainly from the Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin correction.
Ignoring the bank account decision affects trivially the estimated welfare
cost.
14 The complete set of results is omitted for brevity and is available on request.
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VII. Withdrawals and Trips
As we discussed in Section II, in addition to the data on average cash
holdings, the SHIW contains additional information on various aspects
of cash management. In Section II, we have shown that the figures
independently reported for average currency holdings, average with-
drawals, minimum currency, number of trips, and consumption flows
are internally consistent. It is interesting to establish the extent to which
these variables react to changes in interest rates and consumption flows.
While the interpretation of the results that follow is not at times as
straightforward as that for the average currency, they provide useful
information on the way in which cash management is potentially affected
by inflation.
A. Average Withdrawals
Inventory models of the demand for money, such as the Baumol-Tobin
and the Miller-Orr models, imply that the average money balances are
a constant fraction of the size of withdrawals (or cash deposits). Thus,
in these models, one should obtain the same parameter estimates if
withdrawal amounts are used instead of currency as a left-hand-side
variable. In practice, however, the two sets of estimates need not deliver
the same results. First, the restrictions imposed by inventory models may
not hold in practice. For instance, if a withdrawal is made when currency
hits some positive lower bound rather than when it is completely depleted
(as in Baumol and Miller and Orr), then the proportionality between
average holdings and the size of withdrawals may fail. Second, average
currency is self-reported, and there is no guarantee that households
report the mean currency rather than some other index of central
tendency.
In table 6 we report estimates of the determinants of the size of
withdrawals. We retain the same specification as in the demand for
average currency. In this case, however, we report estimates for three
types of withdrawals: those at the bank’s counter by ATM cardholders,
those at the counter by non-ATM cardholders, and ATM withdrawals.
The pattern of coefficients is similar across equations. In all cases the
interest rate elasticity is negative, significantly different from zero, and
somewhat larger (in absolute value) for nonholders of ATM cards. The
transaction variable is positive, and its elasticity is similar in size to that
reported in table 3 except for the size of withdrawals at an ATM. For
this group the elasticity with respect to the scale of transactions is only
0.12, revealing substantial economies of scale. While the interest rate
elasticity for the group of nonholders is comparable to (and is not
dramatically different from) that reported in table 3, the elasticities for
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TABLE 6
Determinants of the Size of Withdrawals
Variable
















































































2R .087 .133 .067
Sample size 5,132 8,910 7,196
Note.—The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average currency withdrawals at a bank (including the postal
system) or at an ATM. The sample excludes observations from the 1989 SHIW. The first-stage regressions are the same
as in table 3. The regressions also include number of children, number of adults, age, age squared, number of income
recipients, a dummy for gender, and dummies for employed, self-employed, and retired heads.
the groups of cardholders are conceptually different since they corre-
spond to different types of withdrawals.
B. The Number of Trips to the Bank and Income Received in Cash
At the root of the welfare cost discussed in Section VI is that households
shift their use of time from productive purposes to cash management
in order to shield themselves from inflation. Faced with high nominal
interest rates, consumers reduce cash balances and substitute time for
money. In fact, the transaction technology specified in equation (1)
implies that time spent transacting and money holdings should be neg-
atively correlated. For the same reason, an increase in the nominal
interest rate should increase the time spent transacting. But this is not
the only channel through which consumers reduce their exposure to
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inflation. The results in table 3 show that as the nominal interest rate
increases, more households choose to invest in interest-bearing assets
(deposits) and also to use more efficient technologies (ATM cards). In
this subsection we extend the evidence in two directions. We use infor-
mation available in the survey on the number of trips to the bank that
households make to deposit or withdraw currency. Also, we show that
an additional channel to protect against inflation is to alter the way
income is received.
Starting with the number of trips to the bank, note that transaction
time t and the number of trips to the bank, n, are linked by the relation
where k is the average time per trip. Substituting in the moneytp kn,
demand equation (4) and ignoring integer constraints, one obtains the
optimal number of transactions:
b/(1b)A wAb
(gb)/(1b)np c . (12)( ) ( )k R
While the consumption elasticity in the trip equation is the same as in
the demand for currency, the interest rate elasticity is positive and,
except for the Baumol-Tobin case, different in absolute value. Table 7
reports the estimates of an equation for the number of trips. To account
for the integer nature of trips, we use an ordered probit estimator, with
trips coded in eight groups (zero trips, fewer than one trip per month,
two, three, four, five, six, and more than seven per month).15 Column
1 reports estimates for the total number of trips. Since questions on
trips were not asked in 1989, estimates refer only to 1991–95. Consistent
with inventory models of the demand for money, the number of trips
increases with the volume of transactions and with the interest rate with
elasticities equal to 0.511 and 0.244, respectively. These estimates are
broadly consistent with those obtained from the currency equation,
reported in table 6.
One problem with these estimates is that the total includes both trips
to the bank to make withdrawals and deposits and those to an ATM,
whereas the two types of trips are different objects since trips to the
ATM require less time. Therefore, in column 2, we report separate
estimates for the number of trips to ATMs. Even though the overall
pattern of the estimated coefficients is similar to that for total trips,
trips to the ATM are more responsive to the interest rate, with an elas-
15 The category “zero trips” includes households that do not hold a bank account.
Similarly, the category “zero trips to ATM” includes households that do not have an ATM
card.
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TABLE 7































































































2R .116 .163 .137
Sample size 23,890 23,890 31,683
Note.—The coefficients in cols. 1 and 2 are estimated by an ordered probit model for the number of trips, coded
in eight groups (zero trips, fewer than one per month, two, three, four, five, six, and more than seven). The ordered
probits exclude 1989 observations. The regression in col. 3 is a two-limit Tobit for the fraction of income received in
currency. This variable ranges from zero to one. The regressions also include number of children, number of adults,
age, age squared, number of income recipients, a dummy for gender, and dummies for employed, self-employed, and
retired heads.
ticity that is about two times greater than that for total trips.16 Overall,
these results are qualitatively similar to those obtained estimating the
equation for cash and provide independent support for inventory mod-
els of the demand for money.
The results for the number of trips, particularly those for the total
number of trips, should be taken with caution. The variable “trips to
the bank” is not clearly defined and might differ substantially from the
theoretical concept in equation (12). Furthermore, because of the dis-
16 These elasticities are not directly comparable with those reported in col. 3 of table
3, which refer to currency holdings for those using an ATM card. These balances are the
reflection of trips to both the bank and the ATM among ATM cardholders. The estimates
in table 7 refer instead to trips to ATMs alone.
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crete nature of the variable and the use of an ordered probit model,
we do not take proper account of the selectivity problem that might
arise if the equation were estimated using only information for house-
holds with a bank account and, in the case of the equation in column
2, for those with an ATM card. The evidence we present, however, is
generally consistent with that presented in the previous sections.
The share of income received in currency is also a signal of the de-
velopment of the payment system. In 1989 the sample average of this
variable was 52 percent. Parallel to the other developments in cash
management, the fraction declined to about 40 percent by 1995. Col-
umn 3 of table 7 reports a two-limit Tobit estimate for the share of
income received in currency. Our hypothesis is that when the nominal
interest rate is high, individuals seek protection against inflation by
altering the way they receive payments, opting for channels that mini-
mize time of cash in hand. The estimates reported are consistent with
this conjecture. In particular, the interest rate has a strong and highly
significant negative effect on the fraction of income received in
currency.
VIII. Conclusions
The welfare cost of inflation we consider in this paper arises from the
increased effort to manage currency in periods in which the nominal
interest rate deviates from Friedman’s optimal monetary rule. One way
to measure such a cost is to integrate the area under the money demand
curve. This requires information on its parameters, in particular the
transaction and interest rate elasticities. These parameters have often
been inferred by aggregate money demand functions estimated on time-
series data, as in Lucas (2000). Recently Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(2000) have pointed out that the aggregate interest rate elasticity de-
pends on the fraction of households holding interest-bearing assets. If
this fraction is small, the interest rate elasticity is low, particularly at low
levels of the interest rate.
We estimate the demand for currency using a data set that provides
detailed information on the management of cash balances, interest rates
on alternative assets, and the adoption of new technology. Moreover,
the data refer to Italy, where bank deposits are interest-bearing and
therefore constitute the natural alternative to currency. These features
allow us to exploit the cross-sectional and time variability of nominal
interest rates and estimate a version of the Baumol-Tobin model with
micro data. In this respect our paper constitutes an advance over Mul-
ligan and Sala-i-Martin’s since they are forced to focus on the extensive
margin to identify the effects of changes in the interest rate. Moreover,
we model both the access to interest-bearing assets and the choice of
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ATM technology and find significant interest rate and transaction effects
in the equation for the ownership of both an interest-bearing checking
account and an ATM card.
The parameters of the demand for currency are estimated precisely.
We find an interest rate elasticity of around 0.5 and substantial econ-
omies of scale in cash management (a consumption elasticity well below
unity). Furthermore, we find substantial differences in the equations
for ATM cardholders and nonholders. The demand for currency of
those who choose to have an ATM card is considerably more elastic to
the interest rate than that of the households that do not hold such a
card. These nonlinearities are important in evaluating the aggregate
welfare cost of inflation.
The evidence we obtain from average balances is also confirmed by
our study of withdrawals, trips to the bank, and types of payments for
income. Overall, our detailed data set provides consistent and encour-
aging evidence for the model of cash balance management we have
studied. Not only are the basic quantities measured in the data consistent
with each other, but the estimates we obtain for the demand for money
function yield sensible and precisely estimated parameters, which imply
reasonable differences in the effect of the new transaction technology.
Our estimates of the welfare cost of inflation vary considerably within
the population but turn out to be small. On average, the yearly welfare
cost of inflation is around 0.1 percent of nondurable consumption. If
intensive cash management is the only distortion induced by inflation
and if a large portion of the money stock is interest-bearing, consumers
are able to shield themselves against the inflation tax, and reducing
inflation would result in limited welfare gains. But in reality there are
several other inflation-induced distortions that we have not considered
in this paper and that can make the goal of price stability desirable.
Data Appendix
A. Variable Definitions
Information on sample design and response rates of the Survey of Household
Income and Wealth can be found in Brandolini and Cannari (1994). In the
empirical estimates, all demographic variables—age, education, occupation, and
sector—refer to the head of the household (the husband, if present). If instead
the person who would usually be considered the head of the household works
abroad or was absent from the household at the time the interview took place,
the head of the household is the person responsible for managing the house-
hold’s resources. All monetary variables are deflated using the consumer price
index, expressed in 1995 lire and then converted to euros.
ATM ownership.—In each year, respondents report ownership of an ATM card.
The surveys also contain information about the use of ATMs. In practice, virtually
all those reporting having an ATM card also report using the ATM card.
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Currency.—The following question was asked of household heads in each of
the surveys: “What is the average amount of currency usually held in your family?”
Minimum amount of currency.—The following question was asked to household
heads in each of the surveys: “Usually, what is the amount of currency that you
have at home before you choose to make a currency withdrawal?”
Number of withdrawals and average withdrawal.—The following questions were
asked to household heads in each of the surveys: “Think about a normal month.
How many currency withdrawals are made by you or members of your house-
hold? What is the average currency withdrawn?” These questions are asked
separately for withdrawals at a bank, at a post office, and at an ATM point.
Consumption.—Consumption is the sum of the expenditure on food con-
sumption, entertainment, education, clothes, medical expenses, housing repairs
and additions, and imputed rents. Expenditures on durable goods (vehicles,
furniture and appliances, or art objects) are therefore not included in the def-
inition of consumption.
Deposits.—Include checking accounts, savings accounts, and postal deposits.
Education of the household head.—This variable is originally coded as follows: no
education (zero), completed elementary school (five years), completed junior
high school (eight years), completed high school (13 years), completed college
(18 years), and graduate education (more than 20 years). The variable is coded
according to the values given in parentheses. For the highest class we assume
a value of 20 years.
Financial wealth.—Sum of currency, checking accounts, savings accounts, postal
deposits, government paper, corporate bonds, mutual funds and other managed
accounts, and stocks. For 1989, total financial wealth is readily available. For
other years it must be estimated because the categories of financial assets (except
cash holdings) are provided in 15 bands; the average value between the lower
and the upper band was used in determining the level of each asset.
Interest rate on deposits.—We have data on the average nominal interest rate
on checking accounts by year (1989, 1991, 1993, and 1995) and 95 provinces.
The source is the Bank of Italy Monetary Statistics Survey.
Interest rate on government paper.—In order to compute the interest rate differ-
ential used in estimating the demand for deposits, we use as a reference asset
the average after-tax interest rate on short-term (one-year maturity or less) Treas-
ury bills.
Number of ATM points per province.—Data on the number of ATM points in
each year/province are provided by a special survey of the Bank of Italy. This
data set is then merged with the 1989–95 SHIW.
B. Summary Statistics
Table A1 presents weighted sample averages of the demographic variables used
in the estimation. The development of these demographic variables matches
that of population surveys, as documented by Brandolini and Cannari (1994).
To the extent that demographic variables affect the demand for money, pop-
ulation aging, the decline in the number of children per household, and the
increase in the number of income recipients should all be taken into account.
The last row of the table indicates that with respect to the original sample, 828
observations (2.5 percent of the original sample) are lost because of missing
values, mainly because some households do not report information on currency
or ownership of an ATM card or a bank account. The sample is therefore reduced
from 32,691 potential observations to 31,863. Since the number of missing ob-
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TABLE A1
Sample Means of Demographic Variables Used in the Estimation
1989 1991 1993 1995
Less than elementary .08 .08 .10 .09
Elementary school .36 .37 .35 .33
Junior high school .25 .25 .28 .27
High school .22 .22 .21 .24
College .08 .07 .06 .06
Male head .81 .80 .73 .72
Number of adults 2.31 2.33 2.31 2.31
Number of children .67 .65 .66 .58
Age 52.05 53.28 53.06 54.07
Number of income
recipients 1.72 1.74 1.76 1.79
Employed head .46 .43 .39 .36
Self-employed head .17 .16 .14 .14
Retired head .22 .24 .26 .26
Living in northern
regions .50 .47 .49 .49
Living in central
regions .19 .19 .19 .18
Living in southern
regions .31 .33 .32 .33
Living in rural areas .05 .04 .07 .07
Living in the suburbs .39 .41 .36 .32
Living in the
semicenter .30 .27 .31 .32
Living in the center .25 .27 .26 .29
Sample size 8,271 8,188 8,097 8,135
Sample size used in
the estimation 7,973 8,127 7,663 8,100
Note.—All averages are computed using sample weights and using the original sample size. Data are drawn from
the 1989–95 SHIW.
servations is relatively low, we do not attempt to model the probability of
nonresponse.
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